SUMMARY To determine whether or not patients require cardiac catheterisation before surgery a computer based mathematical model was constructed based on decision theory. The model was specifically applied to sick infants under 3 months of age with suspected coarctation of the aorta, and a three way sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess the effects on the model of changes in the probabilities that underlie the decision itself.
SUMMARY To determine whether or not patients require cardiac catheterisation before surgery a computer based mathematical model was constructed based on decision theory. The model was specifically applied to sick infants under 3 months of age with suspected coarctation of the aorta, and a three way sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess the effects on the model of changes in the probabilities that underlie the decision itself.
The optimal decision (that with the greater survival rate) was moved away from cardiac catheterisation to confirm the diagnosis towards operating without cardiac catheterisation by the following factors: a higher probability of survival of operation both in the presence and absence of coarctation; a higher probability of survival if there was no coarctation and no operation performed; a lower sensitivity of catheterisation; a greater incremental risk of operation resulting from previous catheterisation; and a higher relative risk of catheterisation in patients without as opposed to with coarctation. Factors that tended significantly to move the decision towards catheterisation to rule out coarctation rather than neither to operate nor to catheterise were: a lower risk of surgery for coarctation if present; a higher risk of failing to operate on a patient who had coarctation; a high specificity of cardiac catheterisation; a lower incrementation of surgical risk by previous cardiac catheterisation; and a lower relative risk of catheterisation if coarctation was absent.
In this institution, the model argues strongly against cardiac catheterisation in the great majority of sick infants with coarctation. Accepted for publication 10 October 1983 ise sick young infants with coarctation of the aorta, but as will be seen the approach is generally applicable to The branch corresponding to each of these three decisions ends in a probability node. The definitions of the probabilities used in Fig. 1 are given in the Table. Thus for the decision neither to operate nor to carry out cardiac catheterisation, the probability node has two branches, one corresponding to the probability that the patient has the disease (p) and the other to the probability that he does not (l-p). If the patient has the disease there is a probability c that he will survive, and 1-c that he will die. If, on the other hand, he does 331 not have the disease the probabilities that he will live and die are d and l-d respectively. Both c and d are conditional probabilities-namely, probabilities of an event given that another event or events has occurred. Furthermore, for each probability node the possibilities are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which means that the sum of the probabilities must equal one.
Operate without catheterisation The decision to operate without cardiac catheterisation does not change the probability that the disease is present but does change the probabilities of survival, since the patient has now been operated on. If the patient does have the disease and is operated on a is the probability of survival. On the other hand, if the patient does not have the disease and is operated on the probability of survival is b.
Catheterisation
Again the decision to catheterise does not affect the probability that the disease is present. Nevertheless, the patient may die either during cardiac catheterisation or between cardiac catheterisation and implementation of the decision on whether to operate or not. Because our objective is to focus on the risk involved in cardiac catheterisation, we defined the probability of death as a result of cardiac catheterisation as r, given that the disease was present. It could be argued that if the disease were absent the risk of catheterisation would be different. To allow for this contingency in the simplest possible way, we introduced a constant of proportionality (h), which represents the ratio between the risk of cardiac catheterisation if the disease is absent and the risk if it is present. If the patient survives catheterisation, there is still a possibility that cardiac catheterisation will give inaccurate information. Given that the disease is present, the probability of the catheterisation confirming the disease-that is, its sensitivity-is e. On the other hand, given that the disease is absent, the probability that catheterisation will confirm the disease is f (1-the sensitivity of catheterisation for this disease).
The decision tree from e, (1-e), f, and (1-f) has four decision nodes. These correspond to the decision on whether to operate or not depending on the results of cardiac catheterisation. We invariably correct to decide to operate if cardiac catheterisation shows that the patient has a coarctation and not to operate for coarctation if catheterisation shows that he does not. In short, the branches corresponding to doing the opposite of what the cardiac catheterisation suggests have been "pruned."
If the decision is not to operate the probabilities of survival and death are assumed to be equal to those pertaining to the decision neither to catheterise nor to operate. In other words, probabilities c and d remain unchanged. On the other hand, it may be that, although cardiac catheterisation does not result in death before operation is carried out, it increases the risk of the operation by virtue of the deterioration in the patient's general condition. To represent this increase of risk, we introduced a second constant of proportionality g, which represents the ratio between the probability of surviving the operation in the presence of the disease if the patient has been catheterised and the corresponding probability if the patient has not.
Computation of suninval chances According to classical decision theory, the best decision to make is that which maximises expected utility,3-which in this application is that which maximises the chance of survival. This is obtained by summing the products of probabilities and utilities all along the branches corresponding to a particular decision. Since just over half the branches terminate in death, which has a utility of 0, multiplying any probability by that utility will result in an answer of 0, thus easing computation considerably. We applied this method to each branch of the decision tree in turn, starting with the two decisions which involve not catheterising the patient. Expected utility of operation without cardiac catheterisation =pa+b(I -p)=p(a-b)+b Expected utility of neither operating nor catheterising =pc+d(l-p)=p(c-d)+d When these two expected utilities are equal, one decision is as good as the other. This equilibrium point occurs at what is termed the critical probability.' Setting these expected utilities equal and solving for the critical probability, we obtain:
Let x={eag+(l-e)c} and y={bfg+(l-f)d} E(u(C+))=px-rpx+y+rhyp-py-rhy =r(hyp-px-hy)+y+p(x-y) Let z=hpy-px-hy=p(hy-x)-hy Then E(u(C+))=rz+y+p(x-y) Setting equal the expected utilities of operating without cardiac catheterisation and cardiac catheterisation we obtain:
Similarly, setting equal the expected utilities of neither operating nor catheterising, and catheterising, we obtain: (3) rp(c-d-x+y)+d-y p(hy-x)-hy If we plot r against p the above three equations give three lines corresponding to critical probabilities separating the three decisions producing the greater expected utility (Fig. 2) . That corresponding to equation (1) is not dependent on r and therefore corresponds to a vertical line separating the decision to operate or not to operate, in neither case performing cardiac catheterisation. That line corresponding to equation (2) separates the decision to operate without cardiac catheterisation from the decision to catheterise. The line corresponding to equation (3) Probability of disease being present (14) Fig Decisions about catheterisation ant it is to be absolutely sure that the disease is present before operating, and the more important it is to be as sure as possible that the presence of an eminently treatable condition is ruled out. The equilibrium point is moved to the left by the high probabilities of surviving surgery, since if operation is highly likely to be successful, one needs to be less certain that the condition is present before operating.
If no disease but operation performed In this instance an inappropriate operation has been carried out (Fig. 3b) . Since babies in the first three months of life, who are in heart failure and yet who do not have coarctation are likely to have another serious cardiac condition, the probability of survival after an inappropriate operation has been deliberately set rather low at 06. Clearly, if the penalty for doing an inappropriate operation is lower-that is, the probability of survival from such an operation is higherthen this favours non-invasive investigation, since there is less need for the accuracy provided by cardiac catheterisation. Changes in this variable do not affect the decision on whether to catheterise to rule out the diagnosis of coarctation.
If disease present but not operated on Changing this variable has a marginal effect on the desirability of cardiac catheterisation to confirm the diagnosis of coarctation (Fig. 3c) . On the other hand, it has quite a considerable effect on carrying out cardiac catheterisation to rule out the diagnosis. If the probability of survival is very low if coarctation is present and no operation is performed it is clearly important to be as sure as possible that there is no coarctation.
If no dtsease and no operation performed Patients in heart failure within the first three months of life who do not have coarctation of the aorta probably have a ventricular septal defect. This is why the baseline probability of survival has been set as high as 0.95 (Fig. 3d) . The Under these circumstances, the diagnosis of coarctation may be missed. We set the sensitivity of catheterisation at 0-99 (Fig. 4a) . Clearly, if the sensitivity is higher this makes cardiac catheterisation more desirable, but even for a sensitivity of 0-999, given the other variables, we have to be only 93% certain that coarctation is present to recommend operation without cardiac catheterisation even if cardiac catheterisation carries no mortality at all. Changing the sensitivity of cardiac catheterisation clearly has little effect on its usefulness in ruling out the diagnosis. In contrast to the first four examples (Fig. 3) , changing the variables specifically associated with cardiac catheterisation does not shift the equilibrium point sideways,
since it has no effect on the decision on whether to operate or not if no cardiac catheterisation is carried out.
SPECIFICITY OF CARDIAC CATHETERISATION
The specificity of cardiac catheterisation is not 100%
because of the existence of pseudocoarctation. We set the baseline specificity at 98% (Fig. 4b) . Clearly, if Macarney, Douglas, Spiegelhalter for coarctation then it is less desirable if coarctation is highly likely to be present. If coarctation is unlikely to be present then operation is unlikely to take place and the effect will be marginal.
Relative risk between absence and presence of disease Fig. 6 shows that if the relative risk of catheterisation in the absence of the disease compared with that in its presence is lower, whether a coarctation is likely to be present or not, catheterisation is more desirable. This is because the overall risk of catheterisation for all conditions including coarctation will be lower. Nevertheless, the changes produced are very minor at the two ends of the triangle, which correspond to the points of greatest interest to the clinician.
Discussion
The concept of decision theory is not new in clinical medicine,9 and has been applied sporadically in both acquiredI0 and congenital1' heart disease. We have, however, found that its application is particularly well suited to the question of the necessity for cardiac catheterisation for three particular reasons. Firstly, the problem is not esoteric; it is faced daily by cardiologists. Secondly, it is relatively straightforward and thereby unlikely to daunt the mathematically unsophisticated. Thirdly, it shows very clearly that a rational approach to the question demands recognition that what appears on the surface to be a straightforward matter actually involves the subtle interaction of at least the eight different probabilities or ratios of probabilities that we have considered. Simplistic approaches to the question, such as "We must have perfectly accurate information before proceeding with cardiac surgery" or conversely "No patient of mine is going to fall into the hands of a catheterizer," are obviously inadequate but so too are less extreme positions which, nevertheless, fail to take into account the whole range of uncertainties involved. One great merit of decision theory is that even if no mathematical calculations are made, construction of the decision tree provides a rigorous intellectual framework for analysing the problem. If the logic of that decision tree is accepted, and the appropriateness of the variables is also acknowledged, then it is difficult to argue with the conclusion.
ADEQUACY OF THE MODEL
The model was deliberately made as simple as possible for the sake of clarity. It Does the decision tree apply to all patients with shown the effect on the model of as wide a range of suspected coarctation? What about patients with probabilities as most clinicians would probably regard associated tricuspid atresia or transposition of the as reasonable, but if not the model may be rerun with great arteries? We estimated our baseline variables on other variables. the assumption that we were dealing with the entire population of infants with coarctation, but there is no reason why the same decision tree should not be used LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE MODEL to assess the desirability of catheterising diagnostic In presenting our results, we have been careful to subgroups. In most cases all that needs to be changed show that they are consistent with what clinical intuiis some of the variables, although in other cases, such tion would suggest. We must, however, emphasise as patients with complete transposition with coarcta-that for some of the variables, if at the beginning we tion, the decision tree would require modification had guessed how they would affect the model, we because of the question of carrying out balloon atrial might have either found the task impossible or have septostomy.
predicted something other than what is actually observed. This applies particularly to the effect of ADEQUACY OF THE VARIABLES altering the probability of survival if neither operation As has been explained, it is desirable where possible nor cardiac catheterisation is carried out. Constructo use long run probabilities in the decision model tion of the decision model has, therefore, been since these are more objective. Where the value of instructive. Another example is the finding that the variables changes with time, however, the use of long better the results of operation for coarctation the less run probabilities also carries inherent disadvantages. cardiac catheterisation is required to confirm the To apply the decision model correctly to a patient diagnosis. This is perhaps surprising. This effect pertoday, we need, for example, to know what is the sists even when previous cardiac catheterisation is not probability of surviving an appropriate operation for held to increment the risk of surgery at all. coarctation today, not what it was 10 years ago nor Finally, in relation to the specific decision on even what it was on average over the past 10 years. whether patients with suspected coarctation in the Statistical methods do exist for obtaining an estimate first three months of life require cardiac catheterisaof risk today from a study based on experience over a tion, we have recently completed a study on nonlong time (for example, including the era of operation invasive diagnosis at this age.'3 Using a combination as a risk factor in stepwise multiple logistic regres-of analysis of the distal peripheral pulses and cross sion), but the necessary information to obtain even sectional echocardiography it appears that one can be this contemporary probability is almost entirely lack-93-8% certain of the presence of coarctation on the ing from published reports. This is despite the fact basis of these two investigations alone. Given that the that an estimate of the probability of hospital survival risk of cardiac catheterisation alone (ignoring of operation is the one piece of information that can be incrementation of surgical risk) must be 2% at guaranteed to be found in any surgical report on the minimum, inspection of Figs. 3 to 6 will show very management of the disease concerned. If the paucity clearly why our present policy is to 
